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The Battle of Pea Ridge
BY EDWIN G. BEABSS
RESEABCH HISTORIAN, VICKSBUBG NATIONAL MILITARY PARK
PART III Gondnued
Sigel was afraid that the Gonfederates, in the wake of their
Leetown repulse, might regroup and send a column to cut
the Union communication lines linking Leetown with Little
Sugar Greek. A patrol consisting of two companies of the 44th
Illinois (A and G) and 20 troopers from the 15th Illinois.
Gavalry were sent to picket the area west of Winton's Spring
Branch.
As soon as the Datrol moved off, Sigel started for Leetown
with three infantry regiments ( the 15th Missouri and the 25th
and 44th Illinois ) and two of Welfley's guns. Golonel William
N. Goler of the 25th Illinois reported, "A stern joy was felt
when General Sigel rode up in person and ordered the regi-
ment . . . to move forward to the support of the left wing."
After reinforcing Davis and Osterhaus, Sigel planned to hurl
the Gonfederates back toward Bentonville. He would then
wheel his wing to the right and attack Price's Missourians in
the Elkhorn Tavern sector.""
Taking the road which ascended Winton's Spring Branch,
Sigel's column moved off on the double. By the time Sigel
reached Leetown, the fighting in that area had ended with
the Federals victorious and in possession of the field. Sigel
was joined by Gaptain Thomas I. McKinney of Gurtis' staff.
McKinney told Sigel that the Union right was hard-pressed.
Unless reinforcements were sent, he warned, the front in the
Elkhorn area was in danger of disintegrating.
Sigel called for Golonel Goler of the 25th Illinois. The
colonel was told to rush a battalion of his regiment and two
guns of the 4th Ohio Battery to the point of danger. This
"flying column" would be led by Major Richard H. Nodine.
Turning into a farni road which passed to the southeast of
Round Top, Nodine's combat patrol pushed rapidly forward.
As he approached the Telegraph road, Nodine encountered
'1 Ibid., 212, 221.
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General Gurtis. The general directed the major to put his men
into action on Asboth's left. By the time Nodine's troops had
closed in on Rosser's Gonfederate outposts, it was too dark to
distinguish friend from foe. To make matters worse, the gun-
ners of the 2d Ohio Battery began to pound the underbrush
into which Nodine's bluecoats had ventured. Nodine accord-
ingly withdrew his patrol to the opposite side of the meadow
which it had just crossed. After he had posted his men in
the timber on the left of Garr's troops, Nodine permitted them
to sleep on their arms.'^
As soon as Nodine's column had been detached, Sigel pro-
ceeded beyond the hamlet to the battlefield. Reaching the
corn fields north of Leetown, Sigel found Davis' and Oster-
haus' troops in control of the situation. The only Gonfeder-
ates Sigel was able to see were ensconced on Round Top.^ ^
In the meantime, the 44th Illinois, the 15th Missouri and the
section of guns manned by Welfley's cannoneers had pressed
ahead. Gallin«; to the senior officer present, Golonel Gharles
Knobelsdorff of the 44th Illinois, Golonel Davis gave him the
task of mopping up the area between Round Top and the
corn fields. To carry out this assignment, Knobelsdorff de-
ployed his men-the 15th Missouri to the left of, the 44th
Illinois to the right of the road. Govered by a strong skirmish
line, the Federals swept forward, "passing over the dead and
wounded, who lay in every direction." As they pushed north-
ward, the bluecoats smashed several pockets of resistance and
captured a number of prisoners. Not until his troops had
gained possession of Round Top did Knobelsdorff permit them
to take a break.''*
Before advancing to overtake Knobelsdorff, the ever cau-
tious Sigel had another problem which he wished attended to.
He still worried about an attack on his left. He accordingly
asked Davis to send a regiment to patrol the woods and under-
brush north of the corn fields. When Davis agreed to do this,
Sigel ordered the march resumed.
72 Ibid., 212. 223-224, 238.
73 Ibid.. 212.
" 74 Ibid., 224-225. 247.
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Sigel's column (a battalion of the 25th Illinois and four
guns ) marched up the road pioneered by Knobelsdorff's com-
mand. At Mrs. Stiu-dy's, Sigel rendezvoued with Knobelsdorff.
After listening to Knobelsdorff s report of the situation, Sigel
decided that he had nothing to fear from the wing of Van
Dorn's Army of the West which had been defeated north of
Leetown. Before pushing on toward Elkhorn Tavern, he sent
one of his staff officers racing off with a message directing
Colonel Osterhaus to join him with the 36th Illinois, the 12th
Missouri, and a section of the 4th Ohio Battery.''^
White's brigade of Davis' division was given the task of
screening the left flank of Sigel's column as it struck northward
toward the Bentonville — Sugar Creek road. The only Con-
federates encountered by White's soldiers on their sweep to
the northwest were a few stragglers who quickly grounded
their arms. Retracing their steps, the troops rejoined the di-
vision. Davis' command camped in John Ruddick's fields,
a short distance west of Winton's Springs.''^
When the Confederates disappeared from north of Leetown,
Colonel Bussey called for Colonel Calvin A. Ellis of the 1st
Missouri Cavalry. Ellis was told to take his regiment and the
battalion of the 3d Iowa and pursue the Rebels. After advanc-
ing about two miles and failing to overtake any organized
Confederates, Ellis retraced his line of march. Following
Ellis' return, Bussey directed him to report to Colonel Oster-
haus with his regiment and Colonel Joseph Nemett's detach-
ment of the 5th Missouri Cavalry. At this time, Nemett's
troopers were posted in the com field to the left of where
Creusel's "brigade" had made its gallant stand. Accompanied
by the horsemen of the 3d Iowa, Bussey started for Elkhorn
Tavern. As he rode off, Bussey noted the hour—it was 5 p.m.
By the time Bussey reached the Telegraph road, Carr's di-
vision was falling back across Samuel Ruddick's field. Report-
ing to Carr, Bussey was directed to dismount and deploy his
troopers in support of Dodge's brigade. Bussey's Iowans pic-
75 Ibid.. 212, 225.
76 Ibid.. 247, 253.
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keted the Army of the Southwest's right on the night of the
The sun was starting to dip below the western horizon when
Osterhaus put his command in motion. As soon as Osterhaus'
troops came tramping up the road, Sigel passed the word to
move out. A short distance beyond Mrs. Sturdy's dwelling,
(which had been tiirned into a Confederate hospital), Sigel
turned his vanguard into the Bentonville—Sugar Creek road.
By the time Sigel's column reached Ford's house it was almost
dark. A short distance east of the buildings, a halt was called.
The guns were unlimbered; the infantry was brought into line
of battle in the fields north and south of the road. From the
ground occupied, Sigel's bluecoats could see the camp fires
kindled by Price's troops around Elkhorn Tavern.
A staff officer was detailed to notify Curtis that Sigel was
in position and ready to cooperate. Before the aids returned
it was dark. Although the artillery to his front continued to
rumble, Sigel did not believe the Rebels planned a night at-
tack. Consequently, he determined to hold his troops where
they were. To keep the Confederates from pinpointing his
wing, Sigel forbade the building of fires. The troops were
ordered to rest on their arms, all unncessary noise was to be
dispensed with.'^ ^
Osterhaus reported that his men "laid down to rest in a wet
corn field, having eaten nothing since morning, but not a
murmur was heard; they waited in patience. So ended the
second day of battle."^^
77 Ibid., 234. 245.
78 Ibid., 212-213, 219, 225, 226; Bennett and Haigh, History of the
36th Illinois. 160.
79 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 219. Like many of the officers involved
in the campaign, Osterhaus considered the fighting which had accom-
panied the Union withdrawal from Bentonville on March 6 as part of
the battle of Pea Ridge.
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Part IV
The Battle of Pea Ridge
THE FEDERALS WIN THE DAY
Both the Gonfederate and Union leaders redeployed their
commands on the night of the 7th. Since the battle hung in
the balance, each wanted to be ready to harvest the fruits of
victory when the fighting was resumed in the morning.
Reports reaching Gurtis from his subordinates and scouts
indicated that General Van Dorn was shifting the shattered
force formerly commanded by McGulloch from the area
north of Leetown to Elkhorn Tavern. As on the previous
night, there was heavy traffic on the Bentonville Detoior. In
view of this information, Gurtis knew that he had better rein-
force Garr's battered command. A staff officer was rushed
off with instructions for Davis to arouse his troops and have
them take position on Garr's left.'
By midnight, Davis and his officers had formed and
mustered their dog-tired troops. When Davis gave the word,
the division moved off. With Pattison's Indianians taking the
lead, Davis' command left the Leetown area. Taking the road
which ascended Winton's Spring Branch, the head of the
column turned into the Telegraph road.
A short tramp up the Telegraph road brought Pattison's
brigade to the area south of Samuel Ruddick's field where
Garr's exhausted troops lay in line of battle. Here, CoioheJ
Shunk's battahon and three of Klauss' guns rejoined the bri-
gade. Pattison deployed his men on the right of the road. The
left flank of the 18th Indiana was anchored on the road,
Shunk's battalion was posted on the right of the 18th Indiana,
while the 22d Indiana held Pattison's right. Gaptain Klauss'
artillerists of the 1st Indiana Battery emplaced their three
James rifles in front of the sector held by Shunk's battalion.
Like Garr before him, Pattison had his troops take cover at
1 O. K, Series I, Vol. VIII, 201.
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the "edge of the brush-wood," a cleared field to their front.
After the men had been detailed for guard duty, the troops
were permitted to rest on their arms.^
White, unlike Pattison, did not deploy his brigade until
morning. At daybreak. White's soldiers were formed on the
left of the Telegraph road. The cannoneers of Battery A, 2d
Illinois Light Artillery emplaced their four remaining guns
next to the road. Three companies of the 59th Ilhnois were
posted in support of the artillerists. The rest of White's in-
fantry was stationed behind a rail fence, separating two open
fields on the left of the artillery.^
Upon being relieved by Davis, Garr recalled his troops.
Eor the time being, his division would be in reserve. Garr
had his soldiers take position in the woods behind Pattison's
brigade. Dodge recalled bitterly, "Davis placed his troops
behind a rail fence and we stood from 12 o'clock midnight
till daylight shivering in the cold, without fires or food, ex-
hausted and without sleep; while all of Seigel's [sic] troops,
who were fresh, slept soundly. They got their breakfast
leisurely and did not get into position before 7 A.M." *
« o «
Nightfall on March 7 found the units of Sigel's wing scat-
tered. Sigel with a large force was in position astride the
Bentonville-Sugar Greek road, a short distance east of
George W. Ford's house. There, his troops were in position
to strike the Gonfederate right when fighting was resumed.
To keep the Gonfederates from spotting his troops, Sigel had
his officers hold the men in line of battle. The soldiers were
cautioned to make as little noise as possible. No fires were
permitted. Many of the soldiers had not had anything to eat
since morning. Osterhaus and several of the officers sent
details to bring up the ration wagons, but each time they
returned without them. The officers notified Sigel it "was
2 Ibid., 250. Sliunk's battalion of the 8th Indiana and three of Klauss'
guns had reinforced Carr late on the afternoon of the 7th.
3 Ibid., 254; Herr, Nine Campaigns in Nine States, 74-75; Lathrop,
History 'of the 59th Illinois, 95-96. As yet, the artificers of Battery A
had been unable to put the two pieces which had changed hands twiee
on the previous afternoon.back in_ action.
4 Dodge, "Personal Biography," I, 49-52.
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indispensible that . . . [their] men should eat something
before entering on another day's struggle." ^
A detachment from the 4th Ohio Battery led by Gorporal
Gonrad Ebner was sent to Pratt's Store to pick up a caisson
load of ammunition. Reaching Pratt's Store, Ebner's detail
secured the projectiles. At 1 a.m. the four artillerists left
Pratt's Store with a heavily loaded caisson, drawn by six
horses. Ebner's detail became confused in the darkness and
took the wrong road. Unfortunately for the Ohio cannoneers,
this road led directly into the Gonfederate Unes. When chal-
lenged by a Rebel officer and asked.where he was going.
Ebner replied, "Dis for Sigel!" Before the surprised Federals
could collect their wits, they had been disarmed.^
Between 12 and 1 o'clock, several of Sigel's patrols came in
and informed the general they had heard noises which sound-
ed suspiciously like troops moving along the Bentonville
Detour, toward the northeast. Accompanied by several of his
staff Sisel rode out to the picket line. He remained there
about one-half hour, but was unable to hear anything.
Unlike the Federals, the Gonfederates had been permitted
to build fires. As he returned to his command, post, Sigel
began to reflect on this. To the east and southeast could be
seen the glare of tlie camp fires kindled by Price's Mis-
sourians, while to the west and southwest "the sky was illum-
inated" at two different points. Late on the previous after-
noon, several of Sigel's scouts had sighted Pike's column, as
it marched along the Bentonville Detour. When he evaluated
the available information, Sigel concluded (correctly) that
the Rebels had determined to abandon their operations in
the Leetown sector and concentrate all their troops at Elk-
5 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 213, 219; Sigel, The Pea Ridge Campaign,
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, I, 325-326. Major Poten's combat
team, along with si.\ companies of the 2cl Missouri and two guns of the
2d Ohio Battery, held the camp overlooking Little Sugar Creek; two
companies of the 44th Illinois and 20 troopers from the 15th Illinois
Cavalry were on picket southwest of Leetown; General Asboth s
column (which had been reinforced about dark by Nodine's battalion
of the 25th Illinois and two ßuns of the 4th Ohio Battery) was with
Carr's eommand southwest of Elkhorn Tavern.
6 O. «., Series I, Vol. VIII, 238; VV. P. Gault, Ohio at Vicksburg
(Columbus, 1906), 254; Curtis. "The Army of the South-West, and the
First Campaign in Arkansas," Annab. of Iowa, Vol. VI. No. III. 152.
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horn Tavern. In the morning, Sigel reasoned. Van Dorn
would hurl his entire army against the Union right.'^
Sigel accordingly determined to withdraw his troops from
their position in the fields east of Ford's house. The soldiers
would return to their camps. There, they would be allowed
to rest and eat. At the same time, staff officers would be sent
to recall the detached units. When the battle was resumed,
Sigel planned to hurl his entire wing against the Rebel right.
Several companies of the 5th Missouri Cavalary and some
infantry would be left to hold the Bentonville - Sugar Creek
road.*
When Sigel gave the word, his officers quietly formed and
mustered their units. Orders were given in whispers as the
column moved off. The march was made cross-country. One
of the soldiers recalled:
. . . we .silently left our position in the field [Ford's], groping
our way among the deadened cornstalks, clambering over fences,
meandering through woods, falling over logs . . . , after an hour's
painful marching we reached the [Telegraph] road, near where a
muddy rivulet . . . [Winton's Spring Branch] headed . We rushed
to the banks, and, lying prostrate upon the earth, quaffed great
draughts of the precious beverage and found refreshment and
vigor in its cooling waters, the whole brigade [Greusel's] brighten-
ing up under its invigorating influence.^
While his troops were quenching their thirst, Sigel reported
to Ceneral Curtis. Sigel informed Curtis that he was taking
his men to their camps, so they could obtain ammunition and
rations. Since it was about two miles from Pratt's Store to
the camps, Curtis was afraid that if Sigel were allowed to
continue with his plans, he would be tardy in returning to
the front. He urged Sigel to let his troops camp on Winton's
Spring Branch near headquarters. Details could be sent to
bring up the commissary and ordnance wagons. Sigel, seeing
the wisdom in Curtis' proposal, concurred. Rejoining his
wing, Sigel ordered the troops to bivouac.^^
Sigel now permitted his men to build fires in the hollows.
As soon as the ration wagons arrived, the soldiers broke out
frying pans and kettles. According to the regimental his-
torians of the 36th Illinois:
1 Sigel, "The Pea Ridge Campaign," Battles and Leaders of the Civil
War. I, 326.
8 Ibid.
9 Bennett and Haigh, History of the 36th Illinois, 161.
10 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 201.
THE BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE 215
. . . a few hastily and half-baked flap-jacks, made of flour and
water, were the first morsels of food which had passed our lips for
nearly twenty-four hours. This, in a measure, appeased our raven-
ous hunger, after which a craving for rest was gratified by an
hour's sleep upon the muddy ground. The damp, cold air, and a
want of blankets and sufficient clothing, renderecf this a most chilly
and restless affair. This dumping down by the roadside is not sug-
gestive of special comfort, but we were thoroughly tired out, and
had reached a point where sleep, however uncomfortable, was a
necessity.
No one removed his sword or separated himself from his gun.
Horses stood saddled, ready for instant service. The mules con-
tinued their braying. Pickets stood with eyes and ears open, ready
to give warning should a night attack be attempted. H
In accordance with Sigel's orders. General Asboth had
withdrawn the two sections of the 2d Ohio Battery and
Colonel Frederick Schaefer's four companies of the 2d Mis-
souri from their advance position southwest of Elkhorn
Tavern. Near Pratt's Store, Asboth found Sigel. The wing
commander told Asboth to have these two units return to
the Little Sugar Creek line. There, they relieved Lieutenant
Conrad Cansevoort's section of the battery and the six com-
panies of the 2d Missouri which had been watching the Ben-
tonville road. These two units set out immediately for Win-
ton Springs, where they reported to Asboth. Thus, when
the battle was resumed, Asboth would be able to employ
fresh troops.'^
« « «
Several hour's before daybreak, Sigel and Asboth re-
portedly approached Colonel Bussey and talked him into
asking Curtis "to call a council of war."
Curtis refused, in strong terms. He stated that "he wanted
no council; that his orders were out and he was going to
fight it out on that ground."
After leaving headquarters, Bussey encountered Colonel
Dodge. Upon hearing what had transpired. Dodge went
directly to Curtis. He informed the general in the strongest
terms that "the troops that had been idle the day before
should be gotten to the front to relieve our troops that were
exhausted."
Curtis replied, "Siegel [sic] should be up with his force,
and that he was now on the ground."
11 Bennett and Haigh, Historij of the 36th Illinois, 161-162;
12 O. fi.. Series I, Vol. VIII, 214, 242-243.
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Dodge remarked, this was not true, because Sigel "was in
camp to our rear, and his men were sleeping."
At this, Gurtis told Dodge of Sigel's and Asboth's efforts to
get him to call a council of war. Although he would not or-
der Sigel to take position until after daybreak, Gurtis in-
formed Dodge, "his plans were all made." His troops, Gurtis
' thundered, would "fight it out right where they were."
Dodge assured Gurtis, if he put Sigel's wing into action
early, "and force [d] the fighting, the moral effect on our
men and on the enemy would be great and would win the
day."
"That is just what I am going to do," Gurtis rejoined. Satis-
fied that Gurtis had made up his mind to fight. Dodge re-
turned to his command post.'^
« « a
The rumble of artillery and wagons moving into position,
and the shouts of the Union officers as they gave orders were
heard by the Gonfederates. At daybreak, the butternuts were
taken back to discover a powerful battle line, with several
batteries unlimbered, in the edge of tlie timber on the op-
posite side of Samuel Ruddick's field. Heavy columns of
infantry could be distinguished massed behind Gurtis' main
line of resistance; bluecoated horsemen were posted to cover
the Federals' flanks. In the distance the Secessionists could
make out the canvas tops of the Union train. It was apparent
to the Rebels that Gurtis had massed his army and would
make a determined "effort to retrieve the position lost on the
previous day." '^
Van Dorn had spent an anxious night. Almost as soon as
the fighting ceased on the 7th, his officers began to send in
reports that their units had shot up most of their ammunition.
When questioned, the chief of ordnance informed the gen-
eral that there had been a mistake. The ordnance wagons had
been left at Gamp Stephens with the commissary train. A
staff officer was sent galloping with instructions for General
Green to put the trains in motion and rejoin the army. Van
Dorn knew it would be well after daybreak before the train
could reach him. In addition, many of the soldiers had been
'3 Dodge, "Personal Biography," I, 49-52.
14 Anderson, History of the 1st Missouri Confederate Brigade, 176.
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without food, except what they could forage, since the 6th.
The.artillery horses were "heaten" down.^ ^
When dawn revealed that the Federals had taken ad-
vantage of the night to redeploy their troops. Van Dom
called for his principal officers. He would accept the "gage." ^^
All the units which had accompanied Pike on the march
from the Leetown area to Elkhorn Tavern, except Watie's
regiment and Welch's squadron, were directed to report to
other officers. This was an example of the low esteem in
which Van Dorn held Pike. The 16th and 17th Arkansas, the
1st Arkansas Mounted Rifles, the 4th Texas Cavalry Bat-
talion (The t\vo latter units had been dismounted.), and
Good's Texas Battery would report to Golonel Little.
Pike was directed by Van Dorn to employ Watie's Gher-
okees to protect the army's flanks. One wing of the Gherokee
regiment took position on Pea Ridge, the other on the ridge
north of Williams Hollow. The Indians were to watch the
Federals' movements and notify Van Dorn if the Yankees
tried to turn his position. Pike accompanied tlie battalion of
Watie's regiment which scaled Pea Ridge. Before doing so,
he gave Gaptain Welch permission to join any Texas cavalry
regiment he wished. Welch chose the 3d Texas Gavalary."
As soon as the units which had accompanied Pike reported
to him, Golonel Little redeployed his command. His infantry
took position in the verge of the timber which overlooked
Samuel Ruddick's field on the north and in Jesse Gox's wood
lot. Golonel Burbridge's 2d Missouri was posted in the wood
lot with its left flank anchored on the Telegraph road. From
right to left Little's main line of resistance east of the Tele-
graph road was held by the 3d Missouri, General Frost's
infantry, and the 16th Arkansas. To strengthen their position,
the Gonfederates threw down the fence and erected breast-
works of fence rails. The 4th Texas Gavalary Battalion (dis-
mounted) was massed in the rear of the 3d Missouri. .
Gaptain Wade's six gun battery was emplaced on tlie
15 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 284.
i^Ibid
17 Ibid., 290. Welch's squadron served with the 3d Te.xas Cavalry
during the remainder of the campaign.
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road about 200 yards in rear of the 2d Missouri. The in-
tervening timber masked the Missouri artillerists' guns from
the prying eyes of the Eederals. Colonel Thomas J. Churchill
with two Arkansas regiments (the 1st Mounted Rifles and
the 17th) was stationed along the Bentonville - Sugar Creek
road. The Arkansans were about 300 yards to the rear, and on
the right of Burbridge's 2d Missouri.'^
Most of the Confederates were satisfied that they could
hold this position against any attack which the Army of the
Sou tlîwest might mount . . . One of Little's Missourians ob-
served:
'io driye us from the ground we occupied was a task full of
difiiculty and danger. Protected by the brow of the hill from the
enraiy's fire, their lines would be entirely exposed in advancing
ujion lis. Our whole battle array was composed of troops upon
wJioie firmness the most implicit reliance might be placed. If the
hoîtile force had been more than double our number, its ranks
wouiü have been so shattered in attempting to reach us, that any
wbi) might have arrived at our line would have been almost sure
ol (hastruction or defeat. 19
Ciolonel Rosser's brigade held the southeastern point of
Pea Ridge (known locally as Sugar Mountain). Patrols
waiched the ground between Rosser's left and Churchill's
right, while Watie's Indians screened the brigade's right.2"
Three divisions of the State Cuard (Rain's, Saunders', and
Clark's) occupied the ground to Little's left, i^ Two Missouri
Cavalary battalions (Cearnal's and Riggins') patrolled Van
Dorn's left, south of the Huntsville road.^ ^
Van Dorn had sent one of his staff officers to order up
Colonel Creer's command. After turning into the Telegraph
road from the Bentonville Detour, Creer had called a halt.
The men were allowed to fall out and take it easy. It was
about sunrise when the aide reached Creer's command post.
Calling to Creer, the messenger informed the colonel that it
looked as if the Federals planned to renew the battle. Creer
was to rejoin the army as promptly as possible.
When Creer gave the word, the officers hurriedly formed
, 309.
19 Anderson, History of the 1st Missouri Confederate Brigade, 176-
177.
20 Ibid., 313, 315.
21 Ibid., 320, 321, 327-328. From right to left these divisions were
deployed; Rains'. Saunders', and Clark's.
22 Ibid., 316, 329.
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their units on the road. The column had not gone very far
before a guide reported to Creer. About the time that Creer's
division forded Big Sugar Creek and turned up Cross Timber
Hollow, the soldiers heard the distant boom of a cannon.
Within a few minutes, a number of other guns had growled
into action. As one of the soldiers recalled, "The cannonading
was terrific — the thunder of the guns reverberating among
the hills in a continuous roar."
Taking the wood road which gave access to the south rim
of Williams Hollow, Greer's troops gained the Huntsville
road. In accordance with Van Dorn's instructions. Creer
ordered his infantry (under McNair) to shuck their packs.
Throwing aside their few remaining blankets and overcoats,
McNair's footsoldiers advanced into the wooded area south
of the Huntsville road on the double. McNair deployed his
command (the 3d Louisiana, the 4th, 14th, 16th, and 21st
Arkansas) into line of battle about 250 yards behind Van
Dorn's main line of resistance. Creer massed his cavalary in
close column by regiments on the right of McNair's infantry.23
« e «
The artillery duel which broke out as Creer's greyclads
marched to the front had been inaugerated by the Federals.
Shortly after Davidson's gunners of Battery A, 2d Illinois
Light Artillery had unlimbered their four pieces, they sighted
a Confederate battery moving into position at the edge of the
timber on the north side of Samuel Ruddick's field. Colonel
Little had spotted White's brigade as soon as it advanced into
Lewis Pratt's field. He ordered Tull's battery to the front.
Manhandling their four pieces forward, Tull's gunners em-
placed them between the 3d Missouri and Frost's infantry.
When notified of this. Colonel Davis ordered Battery A to
open fire. Tull's cannoneers replied. Moments later, a masked
Confederate battery (Wade's) roared forth, spraying the
ground on both sides of the Telegraph road with a storm of
canister and shell. Captain Klauss bellowed for the men of
his 1st Indiana Battery to man their three James rifles.
Springing to their pieces, the Indianians returned Wade's
23 Ibid., 294, 300; Tunnard, Histori/ of the 3d Louisiana, 135-136,
139.
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fire. Klauss' Hoosiers were unable to get off more than a few
rounds, before the Confederates' fire compelled them to give
ground. Limbering up their pieces, the Indianians fell back.
Two of Pattison's units, the 22d Indiana and Shunk's bat-
talion, followed hard on the heels of the retreating can-
noneers. The retreat was so rapid that the officers lost con-
trol of the situation, a number of men panicked.
Apparently, the Rebel gun spotters were imable to pinpoint
Pattison's third unit, the 18th Indiana, which was posted in
the woods on the right of the Telegraph road. This regiment
held its position while Pattison and his subordinates rallied
and reformed the rest of the brigade in the timber about 300
yards south of Ruddick's field. As soon as he had completed
his dispositions, Pattison recalled the 18th Indiana.
In the meantime, Klauss' artillerists had placed their three
James rifles in battery next to the Telegraph road. When the
Í8th Indiana pulled back, the troops formed on the right
of Klauss' guns. To protect his right, Pattison refused that
flank which was held by Shunk's battalion.^ "*
Following the retreat of the Indianians, Captain Davidson's
gunners grimly clung to their advance position for another
one-half hour. All this time, the Illinoisans continued to duel
with the ten Confederate guns, while White's supporting in-
fantry "crouched behind the doubtful shelter of a rail fence."
Shifting their pieces, the butternuts found that they could en-
filade White's infantry.
Colonel White had a narrow escape when a round shot
ricochetted under his horse and tore a leg off Lieutenant
Landgrove's mount. The horse fell. As soon as Landgrove
freed himself from his saddle, the pain-crazed animal scram-
bled to its feet. When last seen the horse was hobbling off
into the Rebel lines, "taking with it all the Lieutenant's
available funds, which were concealed in his holsters."
White now ordered his troops to pull back. Retiring about
250 yards, Davidson's artillerists emplaced their four guns
on a knoll within easy range of Little's main line of resistance.
24 O.K., Series I, Vol. VIII, 247, 250-251, 254, 309; Herr, Nine
Campaigns in Nine States, 74.
BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE 221
White's footsoldiers took cover in a belt of timber on the
west side of the Telegraph road.^ ^
The Gonfederates had scored the day's first success. Fierce
yells rent the cold March air as Davis' division started to
yield. One of the Missouri infantrymen recalled:
The Federal artillery opened upon our lines as soon as it was
fairly light, and the thunder . . . [of seven] guns rolled over the
plain. But a single position on our side commanded the enemy's
tine, and it only gave space enough to work one battery. This was
in the road, about two hundred yards in our rear, and was first
occupied by Captain Wade, whose pieces were discharged with
such accuracy of aim and incessant rapidity, that they swept and
tore through the Federal lines with fatal destruction, exposed as
they were on a high open plain, without any protection, and at
short range.26
Golonel Garr's exhausted division spent the night in the
woods behind Pattison's battle line. When the 22d Indiana
and Shunk's battalion gave way, many of the Hoosiers passed
rapidly through Dodge's camp. Things looked grim for the
Federals.
General Gurtis, who was sitting in the grass by the side of
the Telegraph road waiting for Sigel's wing to arrive, called
for Golonels Garr and Dodge. Garr had little comfort for
his chief. He told Gurtis, "if worse came to worst, he should
endeavor to get out with his regiment of cavalary, the 3d
Illinois."
Turning to Dodge, Gurtis asked his opinion on what the
Federals ought to do in case they were tmable to drive the
Gonfederates from Gross Timber Hollow.
Dodge replied, "Put my command at the head and we will
cut out to the east towards . . . [Huntsville], the enemy are
certainly weak there for we hear nothing of them."
Gurtis agreed to adopt this course of action, if he were un-
able to break the Rebels' grip on his supply Hne.^ ^
By this time, the crisis had passed. Davis had estabhshed a
new line of resistance, and the Gonfederates made no effort
to follow up their success. Garr was accordingly ordered to
25 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 254-255; Herr, Nine Campaigns in Nine
States, 75; Curtis, "The Army of the South-West, and the First Cam-
paign in Arkansas," Annah of Iowa, Vol. VI, No. I l l , 151.
26 Anderson, History of the 1st Missouri Confederate Brigade, 177.
27 Dodge, "Personal Biography," I, 49-52.
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move forward and post his division on Davis' right with
Dodge's brigade on the left, Vandever's on the right.
Garr wasted little time in carrying out his instructions.
Only one battery, the 3d Iowa, accompanied the division as
it moved into position. Gaptain Hayden had his cannoneers
emplace their three remaining guns on the road linking
Pratt's Store with the Huntsville road. Golonel Bussey em-
ployed the 3d Illinois Gavalry and the battalion of the 3d
Iowa to guard Garr's right.^*
When the 1st Iowa Battery took the field on the 8th, Lieu-
tenant David found that casualties, loss of equipment, and
an ammunition shortage had taken their toll. He would be
able to put only one section — two guns — in action. General
Gurtis had a special assignment for the battery, so it did not
accompany Garr's division. Instead, David had his gunners
emplace their two pieces in Lewis Pratt's field to the left of
Davis' division.29
o « o
Sigel's officers awakened their men at daybreak. After the
troops had prepared and eaten a hasty breakfast, they were
ordered to fall in.
In the meantime. General Sigel had summoned Golonel
Osterhaus and Lieutenant Gharles W. Asmussen to his com-
mand post. These two officers were directed to reconnoiter
the ground to the left of Davis' division where Sigel proposed
to deploy his wing. In addition, they were to see if they could
locate a feasible route which Sigel's artillery and infantry
might use in moving to the front.^ " If so, Sigel planned to
hurl his wing against the Rebel's right and rear as soon as
they struck at Davis' division.
The 44th Illinois, Golonel Knobelsdorff commanding,
would follow the two high ranking scouts. Knobelsdorff was
to take position on the left of Davis' battle line. When the rest
of Sigel's wing advanced, the officers would form their units
on the left of the 44th Illinois. Because Sigel wished to keep
the Gonfederates in the dark as to his plans, he admonished
28 O. fi.. Series I, Vol. VIII, 234, 262.
29 Black, Soldier's Recollections, 8.
30 q . fi.. Series I, Vol. VIII, 214, 219; Sigel, "The Pea Ridge Cam-
paign," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, I, 327. Lt. Asmussen
belonged to Sigel's staff.
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Knobelsdorff to keep his men under cover as much as pos-
sible. He would not enter into an engagement unless at-
tacked.31
Reaching the front, Knobelsdorff posted his regiment on
the left of White's brigade. Almost immediately thereafter,
the artillery duel began. When White's men retired, a num-
ber of them broke through the ranks of the 44th Illinois.
Within a few minutes, Knobelsdorff received instructions to
pull back. On doing so. General Gurtis ordered the Illinoisans
to support the two guns of the 1st Iowa Battery, which had
just reached the front.^ ^
Sigel was standing in front of his tent anxiously awaiting
Osterhaus' and Asmussen's return, when Davis' artillery
opened fire. Within a few moments. General Gurtis rode up.
As he did, Gurtis remarked excitedly, "General I have opened
the battle; it will be a hard fight; Davis is already there.
Please bring your troops in line as quickly as possible."
Sigel was taken aback by Gurtis' remarks. He couldn't un-
derstand why Davis had been permitted to let his batteries
open fire, before his wing was in position. A Gonfederate at-
tack at this time could prove very embarrassing. In addition,
Sigel had just returned from a canter up the Telegraph road.
What he had witnessed was anything but reassuring. Not only
was the road jammed with artillery, ambulances, and ord-
nance wagons, but Davis' position didn't appear to be very
formidable. If he marched his wing to Davis' support, Sigel
reasoned, he would have to form his troops behind Davis'
initial line. Here, his troops would find their field of fire ob-
structed, while at the same time they would be exposed to
the deadly projectiles of the Rebel artillery massed in the
timber at the edge of Samuel Ruddick's field.
Explaining his feelings on the subject to Gurtis, Sigel an-
nounced that he momentarily expected the return of Oster-
haus and Asmussen. Sigel asked his commanding general for
ten minutes grace. As he did, he argued that even if the
Rebels attacked, they would be unable to exploit their success,
because his wing would be in position to fall upon their rear
31 Sigel, "The Pea Ridge Campaign," Battles and Leaders of the
Civil War, I, 327.
32 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 225.
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ahd right. As he started to turn his horse, Curtis remarked,
"Well, Ceneral, do what you propose." ^^
Before the stipulated time elapsed, the two officers re-
turned from their reconnaissance. Osterhaus reported, "they
had found an excellent position" on a commanding ridge in
Jesse Cox's field, southwest of Elkhorn Tavern. Furthermore,
the colonel continued, the 44th Illinois was already on the
ground. At this, Curtis declared himself satisfied and re-
turned to his headquarters. Scarcely had Curtis disappeared
than the cannonade increased in intensity. Several shells from
the Rebel guns burst near Sigel's command post.^
After placing Colonel Osterhaus in charge of the column
with instructions to put it in motion, Sigel and Lieutenant As-
mussen headed for the Telegraph road. When they reached
the front, the two officers found several of Pattison's regi-
ments retreating in disorder. Sigel and his staff officer helped
Pattison re-form his troops.^^
In the meantime, Osterhaus' column had moved out. As
soon as Osterhaus' lead unit (the 25th Illinois) entered
Pratt's field. Colonel Coler deployed his regiment. To reach
the position indicated by Osterhaus behind a rail fence and
barn, Coler's troops had to cross Pratt's field. In doing so, the
Illinoisans were "compelled to pass through a shower of shot
and shell . . . in full view of the enemy's batteries." Reaching
the fence. Colonel Coler had his men drop to the ground.
Although they were within one-half mile of Wade's death-
dealing battery, the Confederate gunners were unable to de-
press their pieces enough to cause much damage to Coler's
bluecoats. Shortly after taking position, Coler established
contact with White's brigade on his right.
As each successive unit of Osterhaus' columns entered the
corn fields, it deployed to the left of the one which preceded
Ceneral Sigel rejoined his wing just as the 25th Illinois was
crossing Pratt's field. While en route to the left, Sigel had
33 Sigel, "The Pea Ridge Campaign," Battles and Leaders of the
Civil War, I, 327.
34 Ibid., 327-328; O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 219.
35 Sigel, "The Pea Ridge Campaign," Battles and Leaders of the
Civil War. I. 328.
36 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 219-220, 222.
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encountered the 44th Illinois. Colonel Knobelsdorff, in ac-
cordance with Sigel's instructions, shifted his regiment to the
left. Knobelsdorff's troops occupied the ground to the left
and front of the 25th Illinois. Captain Welfley's cannoneers
unlimbered their five guns in the interval between the 44th
Illinois and the 12th Missouri. Captain Hoffmann's 4th Ohio
Battery placed its six pieces in battery on the left of the 12th
Missouri. The 36th Illinois, which was massed in close col-
umns by division, guarded Osterhaus' left. The 3d and 17th
Missouri (constituting Osterhaus' reserve) were massed be-
hind his center.^^
Asboth's division was posted about 250 paces behind Os-
terhaus' command. Although the wound which he had re-
ceived late on the previous afternoon was very painful,
Asboth was in the saddle.^
Sigel's position, which was on a plateau, was formidable.
From the plateau, the ground sloped toward the woods where
the Rebels had massed their infantry and emplaced their ar-
tillery.
As soon as Colonel Little spotted Sigel's bluecoats, he
called for Captain Cood. The captain was to take his six-gun
Texas battery, move down the Telegraph road, and take po-
sition in the edge of the wood lot on the right of the 2d Mis-
souri. Thundering forward, the rugged Texans threw their
pieces into battery. Almost as soon as the trails struck the
ground, the guns were in action. Good's Texans had a diffi-
cult time registering. Many of thir shots whizzed harmlessly
overhead, or struck the ground and were buried a short dis-
tance in front of Sigel's battle line. To cover the deployment
37 Ibid., 220, 225, 226-227, 236, 238. Major Poten's combat team
(the 17th Missoviri, two companies of the 15th Missouri, two companies
of the 4th Missouri Cavalry, and two guns of the 1st Missouri Flying
Artillery) left the Little Sugar Creek encampment at 9:30 a .m. Upon
reaching Jesse Cox's corn field. Poten disbanded his command, the
units rejoining their parent organizations. Ibid., 280.
38 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 214, 242; Sigel, "The Pea Ridge Cam-
paign," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, I, 328. During the night,
the four guns of the 2d Ohio Battery and the four companies of the
2d Missouri which had been engaged near Elkhorn Tavern returned
to Little Sugar Creek. Here, they relieved the six companies of the 2d
Missouri and the two guns of the battery which had been holding the
works covering the Bentonville road. The two fresh units reported to
Asboth near Pratt's Store.
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of his troops, Sigel had Welfley's and Hoffmann's batteries
return the Texans' fire.^ ^
Writing of the artillery duel many years after, the histor-
ians of the 36th Illinois recalled:
Never were guns more admirably handled than those which all
along the line were shaking the earth with one continuous and tre-
mendous peal that seemed the prolonged howl of a hvmdred thun-
der storms mingled into one. There were moments when the firing
would slacken, when, perhaps, a single gun away off to the right
or left would be heard; then the roar of half a dozen in succession,
so quick that eaeh succeeding wave of sound lapped on the pre-
ceding one. Then the lapping would become indistinguishable,
and . . . [all the] guns would be wreathed in volumes of smoke
and flame, the thunders of each merged in one terrific volume.
, In this sulphurous atmosphere Sigel was perfectly at home, and
utterly regardless of the balls which were hailing around him, he
rode from battery to battery, encouraging the men and giving his
directions as cooly as if on parade. Dismounting from his horse,
he personally sighted the pieces, directed where to fire, and by his
example induced the gunners to redouble their efforts, thus sweep-
ing the ground with such an incessant storm of iron that the enemy
dared not advance in a decisive eharge across the open fields.
But our batteries had not an entire monopoly of the awful thun-
ders of the day. The fatal precision with which the enemy's shot
came tearing through our ranks told us that the opposing batteries
were not handled by novices in the art of war. The infantry were
ordered to lie down on their arms a few yards in rear of the artil-
lery; and while lying thus upon their faces, closely hugging the
ground in vain endeavors to escape the storm of shot which was
raining around, a solid shot ricochets over the field and through
the dry corn stalks, and passing witliin a few inches of Col. Greu-
sel's head, for a moment paralyzed and forced him half way to the
earth; then with a dull thud it plunged in the midst of Company
E,. and was buried a foot beneath the surface, in its passage kñling
Private [John] Ray instantly.40
Curtis kept close tab on Sigel's movements. He told the
members of his staff that he was now satisfied with the Army
of, the Southwest's position. The battle line, much of which
was on open ground, was continuous. Van Dorn's troops were
all before the Federals. Even better, the Rebels were in an
area' with which the bluecoats were familiar. The rugged "de-
files" which lay behind Van Dorn's battle line would hinder
the Confederates' efforts to shift reserves to bolster threat-
ened sections of the front. Curtis felt, "Victory was inevit-
able." 41
As soon as the 36th Illinois was seen to move into position
39 Sigel, "The Pea Ridge Campaign," Battles and Leaders of the
Civil War, I, 328-329; O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 310.
40 Bennett and Haigh, History of the 36th Illinois, 165-166.
41 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 202.
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near the Bentonville-Sugar Creek road, Cnrtis issued orders
for Davis to advance and reoceupy the ground from which
his division had been driven by the Rebel artillery. At the
same time, Curtis hurried to his extreme right. Here, the gen-
eral found a knoll ahead of Carr's battle line which com-
manded the Confederates' left and center. Contacting Cap-
tain Hayden, Curtis told him to occupy the elevation. Limber-
ing up their three pieces, the gunners of the 3d Iowa Battery
moved forward. Unlimbering their guns on the designated
knoll, Hayden's Iowans began throwing shot and shell into
the Elkhorn Tavern area.^ 2 . ^
Within a few minutes a Rebel battery (Bledsoe's) roared
into aetion. The Confederates directed a vigorous counter-
battery fire toward the knoll wher.e; Hayden's people had
placed their pieces. :
After watching the 3d Iowa Battery go into action, Curtis
returned to his command post, in rear of Davis' left flank.
From here the general could watch the artillery duels, in
progress to his right and left.^ ^ ,.
* o » . .
Sigel was delighted to see the speed with which Osterhaus
and Asboth completed their dispositions. Better yet, the fire
of the Rehel battery (Good's), which was emplaced in the
wood lot one-half mile to his front, was not very effective.
Sigel decided it was safe to move closer to the foe. Captains
Welfley and Hoffmann were ordered to advance their 11
guns 250 yards.
Manhandling their pieces forward, the Union cannoneers
soon had their pieces back in action. Good's Texans now
found the range. Since Wefley's battery on the right occupied
a more exposed position, the Texans blasted the Missouri
artillerists with a terrific counterbattery fire.^
While his two batteries were endeavoring to beat down
Good's Texans, Sigel determined to throw forward his right
flank unit, the 25th Illinois.
For the past hour and one-half, the Illinoisans had been
"exposed to a terrible fire from" the Rebel guns. Since the
42 Ibid., 202, 269. • •
43 Ibid., 202, 214. 269. 327-328.
'i* Ibid., 214, 236, 238.
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Gonfederate cannoneers were much more interested in Sigel's
artillery, most of the projectiles screamed overhead. Gasual-
ties in the regiment were slight. In accordance with Sigel's
instructions, Golonel Goler prepared to advance his regiment.
When Goler gave the word, his men leapd to their feet.
Scrambling over the rail fence, the bluecoats stormed across
the corn field to their front on the double and gained a small
field grown up in underbrush. Here, Goler called a brief halt.
Keeping well covered, so as not to attract the butternuts at-
tention, the Illinoisans felt their way through the "under-
wood." Goler had his soldiers take position at the edge of
Gox's corn field. On the opposite side of the field, 400 yards
away, was the wood lot which sheltered Golonel Little's right
flank regiment, the 2d Missouri ( Gonfederate ) .*^
Sigel now decided to extend his left. Golonel Schaefer and
his battalion of the 2d Missouri (Union) was called up from
the reserve. Accompanied by a section of 12-pounder how-
itzers manned by the 2d Ohio Battery, Schaefer's troops has-
tened to the front, moving into position on the left of the
36th Illinois. Deploying his Missourians as skirmishers,
Schaefer dislodged Rosser's outposts from a thicket north of
the Bentoriville-Sugar Greek road. Retiring, the Gonfederates
rejoined their parent unit atop Pea Ridge.'*®
All this time, Sigel's artillerists continued to hammer the
area where Good's Texans had emplaced their guns. The
Texans were compelled to give ground. A direct hit by a
shell from one of Sigel's 13 guns which were now in action
exploded a limber, killing a number of horses. When the
Texans retired, they were compelled to leave one of their
six guns behind.*^
Subsequent to the battle, one of the Texans wrote, "not
less than 100 cannon balls passed within a few feet of us." ^^
45 Ibid., 222. The 25tli Illinois oecupied the ground between Welf-
ley's Battery and the Telegraph road.
46 Ibid., 214, 243.
47 Ibid., 310; Senator Ralph W. Yarborough, Notes on the Douglas
Texas Battery," (Talk before the Civil War Roundtable of Houston,
Texas, on November 23, 1959. ) Cooper Ragan of the Houston Round-
tabie generously let the author use a tape which he eut of the senator's
48 Ltr. James P. Douglas to Sallie Smith, Mareh 15, 1862. Robert W.
Glover, "Douglas' First Texas Battery," unpublished manuscript (files,
Stephen F. Austin State College).
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Observing that tlie Texans were falling back. Colonel Litde
called for Captain Hart. Litde told Hart to have his four gun
battery occupy the ground abandoned by the Texans. Since
his men already had their pieces limbered up. Hart soon had
his battery in motion. Reaching the front, the Arkansans
threw their four pieces into battery.^^
Sigel took advantage of the hiatus between the withdrawal
of Cood's Texans and the arrival of Hart's Arkansans to ad-
vance Osterhaus' battle line. The division rushed forward and
aligned on the 25th Illinois and the 2nd Missouri. Skirmish-
ers forged ahead, taking position close to the wood lot in
which the Confederates were ensconced. Asboth's reserve
division followed occupying the ground vacated by Oster-
haus.™
The build up of Sigel's wing on his left, took the pressure
off Davis. With Sigel's wing massed on their right, it would
be suicidal for the Confederates to launch an attack down
the Telegraph road. No longer would Davis have to employ
his infantry to protect his artillery.
In addition, Davis was cheered to see Carr's troops move
into position on his right. Davis determined to redeploy his
infantry, preparatory to seizing the initiative. Colonel White's
brigade was shifted to the right of the Telegraph road. Be-
cause these movements were carried out in a wooded area,
some confusion ensued. One of Pattison's units, the 18th In-
diana, formed on the left of White's brigade, the remainder
on the right. Davis, knowing that Curtis would soon give
the order for him to hurl his division against the Confeder-
ates, decided not to waste any time correcting his alignment.^*
a « «
Once Sigel had emplaced his guns on the plateau south-
west of Elkhorn Tavern, the Federals began to gain the
upper hand. Van Dorn's main line of resistance was subjected
to a heavy bombardment by seven batteries (25 guns). The
intensity and accuracy of the shelling increased as the Yankee
gunners advanced their pieces. Besides their inherent infe-
49 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 310.
50 Ibid., 214.
51 Ibid., 248, 251, 255.
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riority in the employment of artillery, the Rebels were
plagued by an ammunition shortage. The caissons and lim-
bers of a number of their batteries were nearly empty; the
army's reserve was in the ordnance wagons which were with
General Green's l ^ ^
Hart's artillerists (who had emplaced their four guns in
the wood lot west of the Telegraph road) had a difficult time
holding their ground. Sigel's cannoneers sent projectile after
projectile crashing into the timber. Wade's battery was ex-
posed to the fire of the nine Union guns emplaced to the left
and right of the Telegraph road. According to one of Little's
infantrymen, "The whole fire of the enemy's artillery was
quickly concentrated on Wade's battery . . ,"
With his ammunition running short and his six pieces be-
coming "too hot to handle," Wade withdrew. Wade's bat-
tery was replaced by Glark's. Glark's four guns rumbled down
the Telegraph road, to the cheers of the Rebel footsoldiers.
Unlimbering their pieces, Glark's Missourians opened fire. At
the same time, Gaptain Gorham's four-gun battery went into
action. Gorham's men had emplaced their guns in the field
southwest of the tavern.^^
One of the Rehel soldiers grimly recalled, "The roar of ar-
tillery, for several hours, was incessant, the halls from both
sides passing a few feet over our heads." 5* •
Ahout 9 o'clock, the soldiers posted along Little's hattle
line spotted a numher of Union skirmishers. Advancing out
of the woods and into Samuel Ruddick's field, the bluecoats
threw down the fence. Simultaneously, Union sharpshooters
opened fire with tiieir "long-range" rifle-muskets. These
actions on the part of the Federals convinced Little that
Gurtis was getting ready to launch an all out attack. A staff
officer was sent racing to inform Van Dorn of these develop-
ments. When he returned, the aide told Little "to hold . . .
[his] position as long as possible.^^
52 Ibid., 284.
53 Ibid., 310; Anderson, History of the 1st Missouri Confederate
Brigade, 177. The nine guns emplaced near the Telegraph road were
manned by the 1st Indiana Battery, the 1st , Iowa Battery, and Battery
A, 2d Ilhnois Light Artillery.
54 Anderson, History of the 1st Missouri Confederate Brigade, 177.
55 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 310.
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Van Dorn's jubilation engendered by the initial success
scored by his artillery soon faded. After Sigel put his batteries
into action. Van Dorn was dismayed to observe that the
Federals were gaining the upper hand. When several of the
batteries fell back. Van Dorn questioned their commanders.
Several laid the blame for their inability to hold their ad-
vance positions on an ammunition shortage, others reported
the Yankee fire too much for their cannoneers to endure.
Van Dorn accordingly decided to disengage his army and
retire from the area. The Army of the West would fall back
via the Huntsville road. If the Confederate retreat were to
be successful. Little's and Rosser's commands on the right
would have to hold their ground until the last possible
Following the receipt of Van Dorn's order to defend his
"position as long as possible," Little made several changes in
his dispositions. Whitfield's 4th Texas Cavalary Battalion was
called up from the reserve. The dismounted cavalarymen
would support the 2d Missouri in the wood lot. East of the
Telegraph road. Little's officers massed their troops behind
the fence overlooking Samuel Ruddick's field.^ ^
« « «
Sigel, as he turned his field glasses on the rugged south-
eastern face of Pea Ridge, spotted heavy troop movements.
Not knowing of Van Dorn's decision to disengage, Sigel
erroneously decided that the Rebel brass was reinforcing
Rosser with artillery. At this, Sigel ordered the two artillery
units on the extreme left (Lieutenant Cansevoort's section of
the 2d Ohio Battery and two guns of the 1st Missouri Flying
Artillery) to report to Colonel Osterhaus.
Osterhaus directed the gun captains to shell the ridge. By
this time, the gun spotters of Welfley's Battery and the 4th
Ohio observed that the fire of Hart's Battery was becoming
very erratic. Captain Hoffmann shouted for his gunners to
wheel their pieces to the right and train them on the ridge.
Sigel and his troops were delighted with the effect. The
general reported that the three batteries opened fire "with
56Ibid., 2 8 4 . ••• '• •' "
57 Ibid., 310.
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terrible effect to the enemy,, as the rocks and stones worked
as hard as the shells and shot." ^^
Encouraged by this success, Sigel determined to increase
the pressure on the Confederates. Since his wing was oper-
ating on an exterior arc, Sigel proposed to extend his left.
Asboth was instructed to call the 15th Missouri Infantry and
the 5th Missouri Cavalary up from the reserve. Moving to
the front, Asboth massed these two units behind Osterhaus'
left flank. As it advanced, Sigel's wing would converge on
the tavern.sä
Preparatory to pushing forward, Osterhaus told Major
Wangelin of the 12th Missouri to advance two of his com-
panies as skirmishers. Led hy Captain Gustavus Lightfoot,
the Missourians pressed toward the southwestern corner of
the wood lot, where the Rebels had emplaced Hart's Battery.
Skirmishers from the 44th and 25th Illinois kept pace with
Lightfoot's men on the right; those from the 36th Illinois
operated to the left.
As they forged ahead, the skirmishers encountered a scath-
ing fire from the Rebel infantry. Sigel's gun captains took
advantage of this situation and advanced their pieces closer
to the wood lot. To insure that the bombardment did not
slacken, the bluecoated artillerists manhandled their pieces
forward by successive sections.8"
Colonel Little was distressed to see that the Federals were
extending their flanks. Unless he were reinforced, which was
impossible under the circumstances. Little would be unable
to keep the Yankees from enveloping his position. Never-
theless, Little resolved to carry out Van Dorn's mandate to
hold his ground as long as possible. The well-aimed volley's
of Little's infantry compelled the bluecoated skirmishers to
keep their distance. The inability of their artillery to check
the advance of the Union guns spelled trouble for the Con-
federates. Little knew it would he only a matter of time
before the Federal cannoneers silenced all his guns. When
this occurred, Curtis and his generals would be able to em-
5» Ibid., 214, 238, 243
59 Ibid., 214, 243.
60 Ibid., 220, 222, 225, 227, 229.
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ploy their artillery to punish the Gonfederate infantry un-
mercifully.^i
After another one-half hour's bombardment. General Gur-
tis became satisfied that his artillery had softened up the
Gonfederate position sufficiently to insure the success of an
onslaught by his infantry. West of the Telegraph road, Sigel
called for Osterhaus to hurl his men against the foe.
As soon as Major Wangelin had beefed up Lightfoot's
skirmish line with a third company, the 12th Missouri took
up the advance. Supported on the right by the 25th Illinois,
Wangelin led his cheering bluecoats across Jesse Gox's corn
field on the double.
The Gonfederate infantry (the 2d Missouri and White-
field's Texans), which was posted in the wood lot against
which the two Union regiments advanced, pulled back after
getting off several half-hearted volleys. Gaptain Hart shouted
for his gunners to limber up their pieces.
Before reaching the timber. Major Wangelin was sent
sprawling into the corn stalks, his horse shot from under him.
Scrambling to his feet, the major led his men into the woods.
Golonel Goler's 25th Illinois reached the fence bordering
the wood lot at the same time. Before entering the woods,
Goler had his soldiers strip off their blanket rolls and knap-
sacks. By the time the Illinoisans had disencumbered them-
selves of the surplus gear, Davis' left flank unit (the 18th
Indiana) had drawn abreast of them.
The advahce was resumed, the 25th Illinois and the 12th
Missouri swept into the wood lot. Fortunately for the Fed-
erals, the officers kept a light rein on their troops. Suddenly,
"a loud clear voice was heard to cry out, 'Ready'."
At this, the Union officers shouted, "Gover."
Moments after the bluecoats had dropped to the ground,
the soldiers of the 2d Missouri and the 4th Texas let loose a
"terrific volley of musketry." A hail of lead tore through
the branches and thudded into the tree trunks. From the
prone position, the Yankees returned the Rebels' fire. Several
of Welfley's guns now reopened upon the butternuts. After
*^ i Ibid., 310; Anderson. Historij of the 1st Missouri Confederate
Brigade, 177.
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getting off about six volleys, the Confederates abandoned
their position behind the rail fence which bounded the wood
lot on the north. As they did so, the 2d Missouri and Whit-
field's Texans were subjected to a heavy fire. Colonel
Churchill's command, which was posted on the right of the
2d Missouri, was also compelled to withdraw.
In their charge across the wood lot, the soldiers of the 12th
Missouri overran the area where Cood's and Hart's batteries
had been engaged. The blucoats were aghast to see the de-
struction caused by the fire of their artillery. Large oaks had
been "shivered." A butternut had been "impaled to the earth
by a splinter six feet long struck from a tree by a cannon
shot." Among the booty which fell into the Missourians' hands
were two brass field pieces (one abandoned by the Texans,
and the other by the Arkansans), and the colors of Hart's
Arkansas Battery.^^
In the meantime, Sigel called for Major Poten of the 17th
Missouri. The major was told to take his regiment and storm
the rocky southeast face of Pea Ridge and block the Tele-
graph road. Two regiments (the 2d and 15th Missouri) would
support Poten's advance.^3 Colonel Creusel was instructed to
use a regiment (the 36th Illinois) to watch the ground be-
tween the left of the 12th Missouri and the right of Poten's
.skirmish line.^ *
As soon as he could deploy his men as skirmishers. Major
Poten led them to the attack. The 2d and 15th Missouri, in
line of battle, followed the 17th Missouri as it swept forward.
Prior to the advance of the three Missouri infantry regiments,
Sigel's artillery had subjected to a fearful hammering the
area over which the footsoldiers would have to advance.
Colonel Hughes of Rosser's Confederate command reported,
"a terrific volley of bombs and balls hailed through our ranks;
several were wounded pretty severely, but none killed in my
command." Colonel Churchill's and Major Whitfield's com-
62 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 220, 222-223, 229; Anderson, History of
the 1st Missouri Confederate Brigade, 178; Curtis, "The Army of the
South-West, and the First Campaign in Arkansas," Annals of Iowa, Vol.
VI, No. I l l , 150. Colonel Churchill's command consisted of the 1st
Arkansas Mounted Rifles and the 17th Arkansas Infantry.
63 0 . R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 215.
64 Ibid., 215, 280, 313, 315.
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mand which were posted closer to the Union artillery were
not so lucky, a numher of their men were killed or wounded
by the fire of Sigel's guns.^ ^
Shortly before Sigel sent his troops scrambling np the steep
face of Pea Ridge, one of Van Dorn's staff officers rode up
and told Rosser to pull back. Abandoning their position on
the rocky crest, Rosser's brigade, =^ screened by Hughes' bat-
talion, moved down and across to the Telegraph road. Here,
Rosser learned that most of the Army of the West had already
left the field. Screened by Little's and Churchill's troops
which were still holding the area around Elkhorn Tavern,
Rosser put his hrigade into motion for the Huntsville road.
Hughes' hrigade, which brought up the rear, brought off
two guns which had been captured from the Federals in the
fighting on the 7th.
As a result of the withdrawal of Rosser's hrigade, Poten's
bluecoats encountered only a few stragglers as they scaled
Pea Ridge. Except in a few isolated instances these men
threw down their arms or took to their heels.
One rebel officer, a Captain of a Louisiana Company, seemed
crazed with desperate valor. Instead of retreating with his œm-
rades, he advanced towards our troops until almost alone. Waving
his sword, he called in a loud, clear voice for his men to follow
him, and denounced as cowards all who retreated. They heeded
not his appeals, and finding himself deserted he ran towards our
advance, shouting something which was understood to be, "I am
as brave as Caesar. If we are whipped I do not want to live.
Come on, you d d Yankees!"
The national soldiers, with a generous admiration for useless
and misguided courage, sought to take him prisoner; but a Union
battery opened fire from the left on the retreating foe, and in its
relentless storm swept down the one brave heart which so full of
fierce hfe and unavailing determination, poured out its crimson
tide on the cold and trampled earth.
After the battle, inquiries were made of the Louisiana prisoners,
but none could tell his name. They believed he was the son of a
sugar planter living on Bayou LaFourche, who had joined the
Southern army seeking death. It was the old story of disappointed
love. If not killed, he had determined to become a suicide.66
The 36th Illinois kept place with the 17th Missouri on the
left and the 12th Missouri on the right. One of the IUinoisians
recalled as they advanced down "the northern slopes of the
65 Ibid., 313, 315; Anderson, History of the 1st Missouri Confederate
Brigade, 178.
66 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 280; Curtis, "The Army of the South-
VVest, and the First Campaign in Arkansas," Annah of Iowa, Vol. VI,
No. I l l , 153-154.
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ridge we found the smouldering camp-fires remains of half
- eaten breakfasts, stacks of flour, sides of bacon, old hats, guns,
.and other paraphernalia pertaining to soldiers scattered about
the woods in wild confusion. What remained of the eve-
ning's repast was devoured by our hungry men, who, seizing
upon everything eatable, greedly crammed it down their
throats as they marched along." ^^
Davis' division had struck at the same time. Before doing
so, the brigade commanders had formed their men in the
edge of the Umber. "Two of Colonel Pattison's units (the 22d
Indiana and Shunk's battalion) had trouble gaining the jump-
ing off point. Pattison, taking cognizance of the heavy under-
growth, had his men file to the front. Furthermore, the Union
scouts had told Pattison that the Rebels had withdrawn tlie
masked battery (Wade's) which earlier had given his brigade
such a fearful time. What the scouts did not know was that
a second battery ( Clark's ) had occupied the ground formerly
held by Wade's gunners. As Pattison's troops neared the field,
Clark's battery roared into action. "A perfect shower of canis-
ter belched forth from the thick brush in front." Fortunately
for Pattison's Indianians, the Rebels had sighted their pieces
to high. The deadly hail whistled overhead.
At this, the order to change front forward and form along
the fence was given and executed. Mean\vhile, the division
artillery (Battery A and the 1st Indiana) had opened fire on
the Rebel guns. Davis passed the word to fix bayonets and
charge. This order was greeted with cheers by Pattison's and
White's troops. Covered by a strong skirmish line, Davis'
division surged across Samuel Ruddick's field.^ ^
Little's Confederates pulled back from their position on the
north side of Ruddick's field in the face of this powerful
thrust. Since a number of his men were armed with shotguns
and the Union artillery had gained fire superiority. Little
felt that by fighting in the woods he could partially nullify
these disadvantages. Learning of Little's plans. Captain Clark
ordered his gunners to limber up their four pieces. Clark re-
mained until the last of his guns started for the rear. As he
67 Bennett and Haigh, History of the .36th Illinois, 168.
68 O. n.. Series I, Vol. VIII, 248, 251, 255.
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was leaving the advance position, a shot from one of the
Union cannons struck the youthful artillerist, tearing off his
head. Clark's body was carried from the field by several of
his men.^ ^
Advancing into the heavy timber north of Ruddick's field,
Davis' troops slowly forged ahead. Little's stout fighters were
driven back, step by step. Gaining ground steadily, the
Federals found die timber more open as they neared the
Huntsville road. Pattison and White halted their lines fre-
quently. Bringing their rifl^muskets to the »ready, the
Yankees would get off a crashing volley. Since most of the
Rebels were armed with muskets and shotguns, they were at
a disadvantage in the open woods. One of the soldiers com-
plained, "our lines, now exposed suffered considerably from
their long range guns." '"'
Colonel Rives was shot in the abdomen. As he was carried
from the field dying, the gallant colonel remarked to his
aides, "I only wish I had a hundred lives, that I might die
again and again for Missouri.'"'^
Covered by Little's delaying action. Price recalled Clark's,
Rains', and Saunders' divisions of the State Guard. These
units, which were posted on the left of Little's command,
fell back to the Huntsville road. As soon as the officers had
mustered and formed their commands. Price put the troops
in motion for Van Winkle's Mill. Although General Rains
expressed surprise that "the fight was over; the victory within
our grasp . . . lost," his battery (Bledsoe's) left one of its
guns on the field.^ ^
McNair's infantry held its position in rear of Litde's battle
line during the artillery duel. While they were within easy
range of the Union guns, most of the projectiles passed
harmlessly overhead. When the order to fall back arrived,
McNair recalled his troops. Rendezvousing with Greer's
G9 Ibid., 310; Anderson, History of the 1st Missouri Confederate
Brigade, 178.
70 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 248, 251, 310; Anderson, History of the
1st Missouri Confederate Brigade, 178.
71 O. R., Series I, yol. VIII, 310; Anderson, History of the 1st Mis-
souri Confederate Brigade, 178.
72 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 320, 322, 328. Riggins' battalion and
Price's escort screened the State Guard as it fell back.
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mounted units, McNair's footsoldiers fell in behind the State
Guard.73
In accordance with instructions from General Van Dorn,
Golonel Greer detached the 3d Texas Gavalry. This crack
regiment was given the task of screening the Gonfederate
retreat.^^
By the time that Little's command had been pressed back
to the neighborhood of the tavern. Price's and Greer's columns
were en route to Van Winkle's Mill. Little's troops, with
Sigel's and Davis' commands converging on Elkhorn Tavern,
found themselves subjected to a galling fire. The 2d Missouri,
Whitfield's Texans, and Ghurchill's Arkansans passed in rear
of the hotel. Grossing the Telegraph road on the double,
they reached the Huntsville road. Gaptain Emmett Mc-
Donald and his cannoneers of the St. Louis Artillery held
their ground in front of the tavern until the last possible
minute. As soon as Little's infantry had passed, tiie can-
noneers limbered up their pieces. With the drivers putting
the whips to their teams, the battery rumbled off just before
the jaws of the Federal trap snapped.''^
Three companies of the 2d Missouri were unable to reach
the Huntsville road and were cut off. Displaying the initiative
which has always characterized the American fighting men,
the company commanders followed the Rebel artillery which
had retreated up the Telegraph road. "^^
Golonel Lane, upon receiving his orders from Golonel
Greer to cover the retreat, deployed the troopers of the 3d
Texas Gavalary on the left and right of the Huntsville road.
As they formed, the Texans could hear the shouts of the vic-
torious Federals as they pressed ahead. Lane held his men
in position as unit after unit of the Army of the West passed.
The Texans were unable to discern any signs of panic. As
soon as the last of Little's troops had passed through his
roadblock. Lane reassembled his regiment. Accompanied by
73 Tunnard, History of the 3d Louisiana, 136: O. R., Series I Vol.
VIII, 294.
74 O. ñ.. Series I, Vol. VIII, 294, 300.
^^Ibid., 310; Anderson, History of the 1st Missouri Confederate
Brigade, 178.
76 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 311.
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the St. Louis Artillery, the Texans fell in hehind Little's
Missourians.''^
Troops from Colonel Davis' division won, the race for Elk-
horn Tavern. Upon reaching the hotel, Davis brought up his
artillery. The gunners threw their pieces into battery, register-
ing them on the Huntsville road. While a detail was disarm-
ing a number of Confederate stragglers, Davis had his officers
re-form their units and call the roUs.
Within a few minutes. Colonel Benton rode up at the head
of a battalion of the 8th Indiana and three guns of the 1st
Indiana Battery. Benton, who had been charged with the
mission of holding the rifle pits overlooking Little Sugar
Creek, was chagrined to learn that the fighting had ended
with the Rebels in full retreat. His command would be unable
to add to the laurels previously won at Rich Mountain.''^
Sigel's troops arrived at the tavern hard on the heels of
Davis' division. The two wings of the victorious Army of the
Southwest met at the head of Cross Timber Hollow. As Sigel
rode up, one of the officers looked at his watch. It was
The historians of the 36th Illinois recalled:
. . . officers and men shouted themselves hoarse. Gladness
beamed from every countenance; all were feeling well. Sigel's eyes
had a less nervous and more joyous twinkle than when, an hour
ago, he was sighting the guns which had caused the wrecks lying
around us. Asboth's stoic face for once was wreathed with smiles;
and Osterhaus, never more jolly or at home than on the battlefield,
was overflowing with encomiums upon "der prave poys," and ex-
pressions of entire satisfaction with the result; while towering over
all was the massive brow and stalwart form of noble Curtis, who,
in stentorian tones, congratulated the army upon the glorious vic-
tory it had achieved, and ordered a swift pursuit of the flying
enemy. 80
Carr's infantry, which had done the lion's share of the
fighting on the 7th, did not come into contact with the
Rebels on the 8th. When Davis' division advanced to the
attack, Carr's lagged behind. By the time, Carr's bluecoats
reached the Huntsville road. Van Dorn's army had
, 300. !
''»Ibid., 248, 251, 255. At the battle of Rich Mountain, Virginia,
which was fought on July 11, the 8th Indiana had distinguished itself.
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